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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the sorting of workers in firms to understand gender gaps
in labor market outcomes. Using Danish employer-employee matched data, we find
strong evidence of glass ceilings in certain firms, especially after motherhood, preventing
women from climbing the career ladder and causing the most productive female workers
to seek better jobs in more female-friendly firms in which they can pursue small career
advancements. Nonetheless, gender differences in promotion persist and are found to be
similar in all firms when we focus on large career advancements. These results provide
evidence of the sticky floor hypothesis, which, together with the costs associated with
changing employer, generates persistent gender gaps.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies report that wage gaps for male and female workers arise as a result of
segregation in lower-paying occupations, in less productive establishments and in lower-
paying occupations within establishments (Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske,
2003; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008). Understanding such segregation is crucial to
proposing policies that alleviate gender gaps. However, because a great deal of wage
heterogeneity arises from unobservable skills, estimating the extent to which good
workers are employed in good firms is problematic.
In this paper we study career advancements to understand how the matching profile
arises. This study enables us to investigate whether there are gender differences in the
strength and direction of sorting that induce segregation. In particular, we analyze
how job-to-job transitions and promotions are affected by worker types and how this
relationship differs for male and female workers.
We exploit within-firm variation in wages to rank workers, we use profits to rank
firms, and use information on occupational level within firms to identify promotions.
This methodology allows us to identify gender differences in sorting patterns and their
source.
Using Danish employer-employee matched data, we are then able to trace whether
better-performing workers are more likely to move to better firms (i.e. firms with higher
profits), or to get promoted. This exercise is particularly relevant because different
theories of gender gaps have different implications in terms of the career advancements
of workers. Hence, we are able to assess their relevance based on the patterns that we
observe.
Although we find evidence of a general tendency for positive assortative match-
ing in job-to-job transitions, the strength of this positive sorting in those transitions
is much stronger for female workers. On the contrary, when we examine career ad-
vancement within firms, higher-performing women are less likely to be promoted than
men, especially in firms that have few white-collar female workers, which we label not
female-friendly firms.
Because career advancement is difficult for women in these firms, especially after a
woman’s first child is born, good female workers pursue career advancements primarily
by finding a different employer. Furthermore, these women tend to switch to female-
friendly firms whose promotion policies do not exhibit a gender bias.
Overall, our findings support a refined version of the glass ceiling hypothesis. There
are firms both with and without glass ceilings: because the former have gender-biased
promotion policies, good female workers seek jobs in firms without glass ceilings to
advance in their careers. Interestingly, these female-friendly firms report higher prof-
itability than those firms in which good female workers have fewer opportunities to
climb the occupational ladder. Because only the best female workers can pursue career
advancements via job-to-job transitions and because significant career advancement
occurs more slowly for women in all firms, segregation and gender gaps emerge.
Our empirical analysis of several aspects of both internal and external labor market
transitions considerably extends previous investigations on this topic, as to the best of
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our knowledge, no other work has provided such a clear and comprehensive description
and explanation of gender differences in sorting.
According to the Global Gender Gap Report of Hausmann, Tyson, Bekhouche and
Zahidi (2013) Denmark is ranked eight (out of 134 countries) on the overall Gender Gap
Index, but it occupies 80th place in terms of female representation among legislators,
senior officials and managers. Our findings are consistent with this ranking: even in a
context characterized by a flexible labor market and generous family-friendly schemes,
such as Denmark or Sweden, there still exists a persistently large gender gap in top job
positions and promotions, and this gap seems to be related with motherhood (Smith,
Smith and Verner, 2013; Albrecht, Bjo¨rklund and Vroman, 2003).
Several studies have pointed out different mechanisms for the emergence of gender
differences in labor market outcomes. These mechanisms have different implications
for the career development of women, and this pattern of distinctions allows us to make
sense of our empirical findings.
For example, if there are glass ceilings, a term first used by Gay Bryant (Frenkiel,
1984), women are promoted neither within nor across firms; hence, we should find no (or
a weaker) tendency for women towards positive assortative matching in all transitions.
There are “sticky floors” (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2003) when women do not
confront discrimination in promotions, but they receive smaller wage improvements
than men following promotions. If this is true, although women do not encounter
discrimination in small career advancements, they are less likely than men to pursue
major career advancements because their market opportunities are worse than those
available to men. If women were to have better non-market opportunities than men
(Lazear and Rosen, 1990), they should be less likely to be promoted than men in all
firms but more likely to receive higher wages if promoted and more likely to quit to
pursue non-market opportunities. Finally, gender gaps emerge because of biological
differences (Ichino and Moretti, 2009): since women rate of absenteeism is higher than
that of men, the former are less productive (or, their productivity is less observable)
at the beginning of their careers. If that were the case, gender gaps should be smaller
for older workers at the top of the wage distribution.
Our estimation strategy is then aimed at detecting how sorting behavior of men
and women differ along their career. Differently from previous studies though (Booth
et al., 2003; Manning and Swaffield, 2008), we have information both on workers and
firms. This allows us to exploit within-firm wage variations conditional on observables
to rank workers. Then, we use this ranking to predict: (i) how likely a worker is to quit
the current firm; (ii) how likely it is to go to a better firm conditional on switching firm
(being a mover); and , (iii) how likely it is to get promoted to a better occupational
level conditional on staying employed in a given firm (being a stayer).
Given that one’s outside option is increasing in his type, we expect that the prob-
ability of a job-to-job transition to a better firm has a U-shaped relationship with a
worker position in the within-firm rank: while bad workers are likely to be replaced,
best workers are likely to switch to better firms. As proposed by Bartolucci and De-
vicienti (2012) (henceforth BD), we consider profits as a measure of firm “quality”.1
1Because accounting profits are a noisy measure, different definitions of quality are used in the
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Similarly, we expect that a worker is more likely to be promoted the better her type.
This methodology allows us to provide an overall assessment of labor market tran-
sitions for different categories of firms and workers, and to compare to what extent
female and male workers transitions are affected by their type. As discussed in Section
3, this method is based on two main identifying assumptions: the monotonicity of
agents’ payoffs in their own types and the existence of mismatches in the equilibrium
distribution of workers and firms.
We exploit the richness of the Danish register data on individuals and companies
to empirically estimate the existence and extent of gender differences in sorting. The
Danish data, which are described in Section 4, are particularly appropriate because
they provide information on the universe of workers who are employed in all firms and
occupations for a long period of time. In addition, the assortativity between firms and
workers in Denmark is not influenced by rigidities that are imputable to labor market
institutions (Subsection 4.3).
Overall, we find evidence of positive sorting in job-to-job transitions. Our key
finding is a sizable and significant difference in positive sorting in job-to-job transitions
in favor of women. This difference is stable, as it arises in a number of different
specifications and tests. In particular, gender differences are stronger in certain firms,
which have a lower than average share of female workers in white-collar positions, and
they disappear when transitions are not voluntary (e.g. when they are driven by a
firm’s closure).
In fact, women encounter significant glass ceilings in internal promotions in all firms
but in those which have a greater than average share of female workers in white-collar
positions (female-friendly firms). These findings do not depend on their age, education,
occupation or industry. Hence, the promotion patterns allow us to understand how it is
possible to observe gender gaps even if women have a strong tendency toward positive
assortative matching in job-to-job transitions.
These findings can be interpreted as follows. Since good female workers are not as
likely as good male worker to be promoted, they attempt to overcome these gender
barriers by searching for better jobs in fairer firms. Consistently with this view, we find
that negligible gender differences arise when we look at promotion patterns in those
firms in which good female workers tend to find jobs, at least in terms of small career
advancements. Such firms are also highly profitable, which suggests that the best firms
are those with non-discriminatory policies.2
Glass ceilings in non-female-friendly firms appear to emerge especially after workers
become parents, which emphasizes the role of motherhood as a career impediment in
those firms. Again, this impediment is not observed in female-friendly firms.
empirical implementation. In particular, we use the profit differential between sending and receiving
firms of at least 10 percentage points, the average profits across time, the past average profitability,
total factor productivity and added value. All indicators are calculated both in levels and per worker.
All these definitions yield qualitatively similar results.
2There may be several reasons that less profitable discriminatory firms could survive competition
from non-discriminatory firms. First, social enforcement might result in less lost profit in discrimina-
tory firms. Second, certain firms may have clients with discriminatory tastes. Third, search frictions
may facilitate social enforcement.
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The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the econometric routes that we follow to measure gender-based
differences in sorting. Section 4 briefly describes the data and the institutional back-
ground; Section 5 reports the main results and Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
Our work connects the literature on assortative matching to the one on gender dif-
ferences in labor market outcomes by empirically investigating gender differences in
sorting to assess the causes of gender differences in labor market outcomes.
From the seminal contribution of Becker (1973), several studies have investigated
whether good workers move to good firms, i.e. whether positive assortative match-
ing arises. This literature indicates that different equilibrium matching patterns are
possible, depending on the supermodularity of the production function, the transfer-
ability of utility, and the heterogeneity and endogeneity of search costs (Sattinger,
1995; Shimer and Smith, 2000; Legros and Newman, 2002; Atakan, 2006). In particu-
lar, Merlino (2012) shows that the degree of assortativity can be lower when there are
disadvantaged workers and two-sided heterogeneity and that the interaction between
discrimination and heterogeneity is important to understand how wage and unemploy-
ment gaps can emerge in equilibrium.
However, a number of difficulties arise when these models are brought to the data:
because observable characteristics only partially explain the wage distribution, the task
of defining “good workers” is not straightforward.3 A central study in this context
is that of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth, AKM), who evaluate
assortativity by examining the correlation between the estimated individual worker
and firm fixed effects. In fact, AKM find a small or negative correlation, which has
been interpreted as evidence of no role or of a negative role of sorting in the labor
market. Subsequently, similar studies have been conducted for different countries.
Some of them appear to be consistent with AKM’s conclusions (Abowd, Creecy and
Kramarz, 2002), whereas others do not (Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Woodcock, 2008).
However, the fixed effects approach has relevant shortcomings, as their identifying
assumptions eliminate the possibility of key mechanisms, such as endogenous search
intensity. This mechanism can induce sorting in models with production function com-
plementarities (Bagger and Lentz, 2008). More importantly, the correlation between
worker and firm fixed effects is biased as a result of the non-monotonicity of wages in
different types of firms that can emerge because of frictions that arise between com-
peting firms in job creation (Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006) or in the hiring
process (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011).
To the best of our knowledge, the most interesting recent contribution on how to
estimate the nature of sorting is the test provided by BD.4 These authors provide an
3See Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann and Werwatz (2005) for a survey of the literature.
4Other recent contributions are those of Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) and Lopes De Melo (2009).
However, both of these approaches are limited in that, although they can detect the strength of sorting,
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estimation strategy that is grounded on agents’ payoff monotonicity among their (own)
types and the presence of some mismatches between workers and firms in the equilib-
rium distribution. The latter condition is crucial, as perfect sorting would make both
sources of heterogeneity empirically indistinguishable. Using an employer-employee
data set, BD exploit within-firm variations in wages to rank worker types (within
firms), and they utilize profits to rank firm types. First, we enrich their analysis by
looking also at promotions. Second, and most importantly, we document important
gender differences in sorting patterns in different types of transitions.
Groes, Kircher and Manovskii (conditionally accepted) use a similar approach to
rank workers, but within occupations. They document a U-shaped and directional
pattern for occupational mobility: both low and high wage earners within an occu-
pation are more likely to leave their occupation, and the high earners tend to switch
to new occupations with higher average wages. Our work complements those findings
since, on the one hand, we find similar patterns regarding positive sorting in job-to-job
transitions and promotions and, on the other, we extend the analysis to female workers.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to use such an empirical
strategy to study gender differences in sorting. We are clearly not the first though
to study career developments to disentangle different theories of gender gaps. Most
notably, Booth et al. (2003) find support for their model of sticky floors, in which men
and women are equally likely to be promoted but women receive lower wage increases.
Manning and Swaffield (2008) find that job mobility explains little of the gender gap
that emerges 10 years after entry in the labor market. Yet, they do not look separately
at transitions within and across employers. More importantly, these authors did not
have access to detailed information on firms or job-to-job transitions. Hence, our
study represents a significant advancement with respect to theirs. While Bayard et al.
(2003) and Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) study gender differences matching patterns
using matched employees-employer data, they examine only segregation patterns (i.e.
the static matching profile). In our paper, we directly test job-to-job transitions by
examining both career paths and a wide range of transitions; in other words, we study
how the matching profile arises. In addition, we take advantage of the high degree of
flexibility of the Danish labor market and the completeness of our data.
The work of Gayle, Golan and Miller (2012) is the most closely related to our study.
These authors focus on CEOs of publicly listed firms to trace the careers of top CEOs,
and they find that women are more likely to exit their occupations but more likely to
become CEOs when they have not exited. Our findings that women who pursue career
advancements are a very selected sample are somehow consistent with these results.
However, we do not restrict our attention to CEOs. Most importantly, we provide
some descriptive evidence that women are excluded from career advancements because
of gender bias in promotions in certain firms.
they cannot detect its sign.
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3 The Estimation Strategy
To study how gender differences in job-to-job transitions can be recovered using data
on wages and profits, we propose a simple theoretical framework with four building
blocks: mismatch, learning, on-the-job search and promotions. While the model we
propose extends Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) introducing promotions, we simplify
some aspects of their model: we refer the interested reader to that paper for a more
in-depth analysis.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
The framework is the following. There is a unit mass of workers, half of which are
males and the rest females, and a mass 1 of firms, a proportion 1 − δ(> 1/2) of
which are female-friendly—it will be explained shortly in which sense. Workers and
firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity. Workers draw their type e
independently of their gender, from a distribution Γ(e) with smooth density γ(e) on
(0, 1/τ ], τ ∈ (1, τ¯ ]. Firms draw their type f from distribution Υ(f) independently of
their female-friendliness, with a smooth density ν(f) on [0, 1].
When types e ad f form a match, they produce an output Y (e, f) ≥ 0 while having
an outside option of remaining unmatched, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero.
Hence, since output is non-negative, all agents will prefer to match. We assume that
workers and firms can be ranked according to their productivity, i.e. Ye > 0 and
Yf > 0. Then, it is without loss of generality to index a worker by its rank in terms of
productivity, i.e. by the fraction of workers that are less productive than her. Similarly,
we can identify each firm by its rank in the distribution of firm productivity. This means
that the distributions Γ(·) and Υ(·) are uniform.
We assume the following production function that induces positive sorting:5
Y (e, f) = αeθf θ, (1)
where α > 0 and θ > 0 are parameters that indicate the strength of the complemetari-
ties. We denote an assignment of workers to firms as µ. Since the production function is
with complements, i.e. Yef > 0, it induces positive assortative matching in a frictionless
economy, i.e. µ(e) = f (Becker, 1973).
There are two periods. During the first period, workers and firms are randomly
matched after their respective types have been realized. Once a match is created,
production takes place and wages are paid.
A worker who in the first period is of type e in a match (e, f) in the second pe-
riod becomes of type τe, if e ≥ f . This is a reduced form way to introduce learning,
which can be interpreted as learning-by-doing or learning one’s type. According to the
first interpretation, during the first period, workers acquire relevant experience that
5For a more general formulation, we refer the reader to Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), since they
formally study the general case beyond this example, although in a model without promotions. While
the results that we derive do not depend on the particular example chosen, this enables us to keep
the analysis concise.
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improves their skills as long as e ≥ f . In other words, there are skill requirements (Al-
brecht and Vroman, 2002; Merlino, in press): only agents that are sufficiently qualified
understand the technology enough to improve it. As a result, in the second period
workers are more productive, i.e. they increase their type. According to the second in-
terpretation, it takes time and work experience for agents to learn their type (Groes et
al., conditionally accepted), and they need to work in a job that is challenging enough
to acquire relevant information.
However, not female-friendly firms do not allow female workers to express their
acquired potential: for example, the suggestions they make to improve the productivity
of the current match are not listened to, or they are not assigned better tasks within
the firm. Formally, the output of such match in the second period remains the same,
i.e. αeθf θ, while female workers employed in female-friendly firms and all male workers
produce α(τe)θf θ. We will label with P those matches in which promotions could take
place, that is, all matches but those in which a female worker is employed in a not
female-friendly firm.
In the second period, before production takes place each pair can decide whether
to stay together or to search for a better partner. Those pairs that decide not to stay
together incur a constant search cost of c, as in Atakan (2006), and are then matched
according to the frictionless allocation. Only then, production takes place and wages
are paid.
We assume that workers in the first period do not know whether the firm they are
matched with is female-friendly or not. This is known only in the second period, once
the firm actually promotes a good female worker, or doesn’t. Furthermore, in the first
period agents cannot search. This is to embed the idea that some time is needed before
quitting their current job and move to another one, as it is reasonable for new entrants
in the labor market.6
Wages are determined by a bargaining model with inside options, see Muthoo
(1999). This is equivalent to saying that the wage is negotiated every period where,
in each period, the worker (respectively the firm) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer with
probability 1/2. If the firm (or the worker) rejects the offer, in the first period they
enjoy a payoff equal to zero.7
Given this wage determination protocol, first period wages (and profits) in a given
match (e, f) are equal to Y (e, f)/2. Hence,
Remark 1 In the first period, wages in a given firm provide us a correct ranking of
workers’ types.
This observation simply follows from the fact that, conditional on the firm productivity
f , wages are increasing in the worker type e, as implied by (1).
6As it will be clear below, such an assumption is made not to deal with distribution of workers
types between stayers and movers across periods. Allowing for costly search in the first period would
nonetheless lead the same results, since wages would still provide a correct ranking of workers’ types.
7Since workers do not observe the firm type in the first period, Nash bargaining with outside
options would not be an ideal solution concept to determine wages given that there does not exist an
axiomatization of this solution concept in games with asymmetric information.
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In period 2, wages in the frictionless allocation are given by
max
e
Y (e, f)− w2(e),
which, since Γ(·) = e and Υ(·) = f , yields8
w?(e) =
∫ e
0
∂Y (e˜, µ(e˜))
∂e
dΓ(e˜) =
α
2
e2θ, (2)
and
pi?(f) =
∫ f
0
∂Y (µ−1(f˜), f˜)
∂f˜
dΥ(f˜) =
α
2
f 2θ.
A worker e who stays matched with a firm f in period 2 receives a wage that
depends on his inside option, which now is the match in the instantaneous frictionless
allocation. Hence,
w2(e, f) =
1
2
[Y (e, f)− pi?(f)] + 1
2
w?(e) (3)
Given such payoffs, a pair will remain matched if both the worker and the firm involved
in the match prefer to stay together rather than to pay c and get matched with their
optimal type in the frictionless allocation. In other words, the worker or the firm will
not sever the match whenever the surplus generated S(e, f) is positive.
In period 2, a firm hence is more likely to retain workers that are not too mis-
matched. Furthermore, since female workers employed in not female-friendly firms do
not get promoted, they are hence more likely to search than others because they have
very attractive outside options.
In particular, the surplus of a match (e, f) in which e ≥ f is
S(e, f) =

α(τe)θf θ − α
2
(τe)2θ − α
2
f 2θ + 2c if (e, f) ∈ P,
αeθf θ − α
2
(τe)2θ − α
2
f 2θ + 2c if e ≥ f and (e, f) /∈ P,
As a result, a match (e, f) ∈ P will not be destroyed if e ∈ AP2 (f) where9
AP2 (f) =
[(
f θ − 2
√
c
α
)1/θ
,
1
τ
(
f θ + 2
√
c
α
)1/θ]
. (4)
8Since in period 2, workers’ and firms’ types are realized, in the frictionless allocation female
workers that improved their type will get matched with female-friendly firms. Our assumptions make
sure that there are always enough female friendly firms so that female workers who decide to search
can always find such a firm.
9For sake of brevity, we are abstracting here from boundaries conditions resulting from the fact
that for low types surplus might not exceed the total search cost of 2c. In order to avoid keeping track
of endogenous entry, we assume that people will search even if that is the case.
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From this acceptance set, it is easy to see that
(
f θ + 2
√
c/α
)1/θ
/t is always bigger
than f , i.e. there will be some promotions, if τ < τ¯ , where τ¯ =
(
2
√
c/α
)1/θ
. A match
(e, f) /∈ P instead will not be destroyed if e ∈ AD2 , where
AD2 (f) =
[(
f θ − 2
√
c
α
)1/θ
, e¯
]
. (5)
Substituting (2) into w2(e, f) for those matches which are acceptable, the following
observations immediately follow.
Remark 2 In the second period, wages and profits are increasing in own type. Wages
are non-monotonic in firm type.
Remarks 1 and 2 imply that we can rank workers using their position in the wage
distribution in a given firm. BD show that this is true also in more general frameworks.
However, since wages are non-monotonic in firm type, it is not possible from wage data
alone to detect sorting using only data from this period. Eeckhout and Kircher (2011)
show that, because of this, also the fixed effects approach developed by AKM does not
guarantee identification.
More than that, Proposition 2 in BD, which shows that mean payoffs conditional on
being matched are increasing in agents’ own types, applies in our framework. Hence,
on average, we can rank firms using profits. Since different firms might have different
pools of workers, it could be that a good firm matched with bad agents has worse
profits than a bad firm matched with a good agent. Nonetheless, the possibility of
search puts bounds on the degree of mismatch that can arise, allowing for a correct
ranking of firms.
BD show that looking at job-to-job transitions it is possible to identify the sign and
strength of sorting. So, we can test whether a function that induces positive sorting as
the one we assumed is appropriate.10
Given the acceptance sets of the different types of firms, we can now state the
empirical predictions of the theoretical analysis.
Empirical Predictions. Assume production is given by (1) and τ < τ¯ . Consider
em and ef such that em is male, ef is female and em = ef . Then,
(i) the higher em or ef , the higher the probability of moving to a better firm;
(ii) the probability of moving to a better firm with respect to other workers of the
same gender is higher for ef ;
(iii) the probability of being promoted with respect to other workers of the same
gender is higher for em.
These results follow immediately from the fact that e¯ <
(
f θ + 2
√
c/α
)1/θ
/t = e¯,
so that there will be more job-to-job transitions from D matches than from P matches.
10An example of a function that induces negative assortative sorting is α2 (1 − f)2θ + g(f), where
g(·) is an increasing function. See Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) for further details.
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In other words, female workers that are not promoted in not female-friendly firms
are more likely to move to better firms if they are good enough, while good male
workers are more likely to be promoted in the firm where they are currently employed.
Hence,
∫ e¯
f
w(e, f)de <
∫ e¯
f
w(e, f)de and
∫ τ
e¯
w(e, f)de >
∫ τ
e¯
w(e, f)de. In other words,
the association between the probability of moving to a better firm and wages should
be higher for female workers, while the association between the probability of being
promoted and wages should be stronger for male workers. These are the predictions
that we will test in our empirical exercise.
Furthermore, we can now use the theoretical framework we developed to understand
the implications for gender differences in labor market transitions of other theories of
gender gaps. For example, if all firms were not female-friendly, female workers would
not have better outside options in female-friendly firms, so that they would not be
more likely to move to better firms than males. A similar implication would be true
if women had better non-market opportunities, but because they would be more likely
to quit rather than to pursue job-to-job transitions to better firms. On the contrary,
if all firms were female-friendly, we should not observe any gender differences in any
transitions. This would be true even if female workers types were drawn from a worse
distribution, since in that case the outside option for them would not be relatively
more attractive than for men.
Conversely, if all firms displayed sticky floors but no glass ceilings, female workers
would be treated in the same way in all firms, implying that there should not be a
gender biased in small promotions in any firm. If female workers learned more slowly
than men to produce more or their own type, we would expect that females are less
likely to be promoted and more likely to move to other firms in all firms with respect
to men, but equally likely conditionally on their respective type. Finally, if gender
gaps were driven by biological differences due to age, we should not observe gender
difference in promotions in the second period, or when workers get older, at least in
regressions that are run separately across genders.
To conclude, let us stress that our estimation strategy for detecting gender differ-
ences in sorting is grounded on agents’ payoff monotonicity among their own types
and the presence of some mismatches between workers and firms in the equilibrium
distribution. The former assumption is a natural assumption that is consistent with
a large family of models, well beyond the particular model studied here. The latter
condition is crucial, as perfect sorting would make both sources of heterogeneity em-
pirically indistinguishable because no transitions would be observed. Yet, even in a
flexible labor market, such as the Danish labor market, mismatches and frictions are
likely to arise for a variety of reasons.11
11Search models rely on the assumption that time and effort are needed for workers to change
jobs because they possess imperfect information about the labor market. However, even with full
information and no mobility costs, firms may have monopsony power if jobs are differentiated as
a result of, for example, commuting distances or non-monetary factors. Rents in the employment
relationship may also arise as a result of specific wage-setting mechanisms, such as efficiency wages,
or the accumulation of specific human capital. For a recent review of the theory and empirical work
on imperfect labor markets, see Manning (2011).
10
3.2 Basic Empirical Approach
Based on our theoretical analysis, we estimate the following linear probability model,
which is conditional on workers’ movements (i.e. for the sample of movers):
move upijrt = α0 + α1waget−1(ei, fj) + α2(waget−1(ei, fj) ∗ genderi)
+α3genderi + x
′
ijt−1β + z
′
jt−1γ1 + z
′
rtγ2 + zt + uj + it (6)
where move upijrt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if employee i, who has
worked in the sending firm j, moves to a “better” receiving firm r at time t. The
term waget−1(ei, fj) is the log of the wage earned in sending firm j by employee i,
which is increasing in her own type ei, and fj is the employer type. As there are many
worker characteristics that may influence wages and mobility, such as demographic
characteristics, and it is unclear to what extent the monotonicity assumption on payoffs
is fulfilled when comparing co-workers in different occupations, we augment equation
(6) with the vector xij. This vector consists of relevant worker characteristics, such
as age, tenure, work experience, ethnicity, marital status, parental status, education,
occupation and a family network dummy (i.e. a dummy that records whether a worker
has had at least one parent employed as a manager). The vectors zj and zr include the
share of white-collar women, which is a proxy of the female-friendliness of a firm, and
the size of the sending and receiving firm, respectively while the vector zt represents
time fixed effects. Finally, uj captures the fixed effects of firm j and it is an mean zero
error term.12
Also, in the theoretical model, transitions to firms with higher profits are always
associated with higher wages. Yet, in the main analysis, we use the former route to
identify sorting in job-to-job transitions. Better working conditions beside wages. In
any case, in the empirical section we will also provide robustness checks using transi-
tions to better firms that also entail higher wages. In order to alleviate the problem
related to the measure of profits, we apply alternative definitions and measures of a
firm’s quality.13
In particular, the extent and sign of sorting in job-to-job transitions are tested by
12We estimate equation 6 with OLS after we have centered both the dependent and independent
variable using a within-firm transformation, to control for firm fixed effects. While such an approach
is not obviously inferior to a logit model, at least if the “right” non-linear model is unknown (An-
grist and Krueger, 2001), its results are straightforward to interpret, it eases the comparability of the
coefficients and it allows an easy implementation of hypothesis testing on the difference between coef-
ficients estimated across all sub-samples considered. Specifically, we estimate the following demeaned
equation:
˜move upijrt = α˜0 + α1 ˜waget−1(ei, fj) + α2( ˜waget−1(ei, fj) ∗ ˜genderi)
+α3 ˜genderi + ˜xijt−1′β + ˜zjt−1′γ1 + z˜rt′γ2 + z˜t + ˜it (7)
where the tilde reflects the within-firm transformed data in which the firm mean has been removed
from each individual observation and which removes the term uj .
13Some of these definitions are time-dependent, whereas others are not. The results using alternative
definitions of firm quality, including value added and TFP, are available in an Online Appendix.
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investigating whether coefficient α1 is different from zero. More specifically, if α1 > 0,
then there is evidence of positive sorting because the positive sign indicates that better
workers (i.e. those workers who receive higher wages in a given firm after controlling for
observables) are more likely to move to firms that earn higher profits. Hence, a more
positive coefficient indicates a relatively stronger tendency towards positive assortative
matching.
The focus of this paper is to test whether the degree and sign of sorting in job-
to-job transitions vary according to gender using two strategies: first, by estimating
the coefficient α2 and, second, by estimating equation (6) separately by gender and
testing whether α1 significantly varies across the female and male sub-samples. We
will focus mostly on the second approach, which accounts for the concern that the
rankings may be biased across genders because the wages of women are typically not
directly comparable with those of men.
With regard to the sample of stayers and their probability of being promoted, a
similar model is implemented:
promijt = α0 + α1waget−1(ei, fj) + α2(waget−1(ei, fj) ∗ genderi)
+α3genderi + x
′
ijt−1β + z
′
jtγ + zt + zi + uj (8)
where promijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if employee i, who has worked
within a specific occupation in firm j, is promoted to a higher occupational level.14
The term uj captures within firm fixed effects. As in the previous model, the vector
xijt−1 and zjt include worker and firm characteristics while the vectors zt and zi are
time and industry dummies.15
4 Data and institutional background
The key features of our data are that they cover the universe of employees and firms,
and that they match employees and firms records. Both of these features make these
data particularly suitable for our purposes, as they enable us to detect moving workers
in each year and their sending and receiving firms (Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012).
We use Danish data mainly for two reasons. First, a big and complete sample of
both firms and workers is available for Denmark. This is crucial for our empirical
methodology since we want to keep track of workers career advancements. Second,
Denmark has a very flexible labor market, similar to the one of the U.S.16. Hence, we
expect our analysis to be relevant beyond the case of Denmark studied here.
14Three main occupational groups are considered: managers, middle-managers and blue-collar work-
ers.
15As in equation 6, we estimate equation 8 with OLS on the transformed data.
16Groes (2010) documents that the relationship between occupational tenure and wages and the
hazard rates of leaving an occupation are similar in Denmark and in the U.S.
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4.1 Data
The data set, provided by Statistics Denmark, is a merged employer-employee unbal-
anced panel sample of Danish firms observed over the 1996-2005 period.
The firm-level data17 includes sales, employment, value added, materials, profits,
fixed assets and a two-digit NACE identifier. All the companies in the sample have
more than 20 employees and are private firms, i.e. not part of the public sector.18 All
firms with imputed accounting variables are omitted from the analysis.
The individual-level data, available from 1980 onward, cover the working age pop-
ulation. These data include wage, age, gender, marital status, the number of children,
experience, tenure, highest completed education, occupation and information on the
family background characteristics. Apart from deaths and permanent migration, there
is no attrition in the data set. The labor market status of each person as of the last
week in November is recorded as the relevant datum for each person for that year.
Therefore, if a worker changes jobs, then we observe only the year in which this change
occurred.19 However, we can observe whether a worker experiences unemployment and
the duration (in weeks) of the overall unemployment period in a calendar year.
In the analysis that follows, we include only individuals with a positive annual
salary20 and individuals younger than 60. Furthermore, apprentices and part-time
employees are excluded from the main analyses.
Most of the empirical estimations are based on two samples. The first sample
considers only those workers who, within the 1996-2005 period, switched at least once
from one firm (the sending firm, according to our terminology) to another firm (the
17Firm-level statistics have been gathered by Statistics Denmark in several ways. All firms with
more than 50 employees or with profits higher than a given threshold have been surveyed directly.
The other firms are recorded in accordance with a stratified sample strategy. The surveyed firms can
choose whether to submit their annual accounts and other specifications or complete a questionnaire.
To facilitate responses, the questions are formulated similarly to those in the Danish annual accounts
legislation. The final sample includes the following industries: the manufacturing of food, beverages
and tobacco; the manufacturing of textiles and leather; the manufacturing of wood products and
printing; the manufacturing of chemicals and plastic products; the manufacturing of other non-metallic
mineral products; the manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products; the manufacturing
of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; construction; the sale and repair of motor vehicles, the sale of
automotive fuel; wholesale except for motor vehicles; the retail trade of food; department stores; the
retail sale of pharmaceutical goods and cosmetic articles; the retail sale of clothing and footwear;
other retail sale and repair work; hotels and restaurants; land transport and transport via pipelines;
water transport; air transport; supporting transport activities; post and telecommunications; finance;
insurance; activities auxiliary to finance; real estate activities; the renting of transport equipment
and machinery; computer and computer-related activities; research and development; consultancy
activities; and cleaning activities.
18As our empirical strategy involves examining job-to-job transitions by comparing movers, our
estimation strategy uses only those firms from which there are at least two movers over the sample
period; hence, we omitted from the sample firms with fewer than 20 employees, as they do not have
a sufficient number of transitions. Furthermore, because we rank firms based on their profits, we
exclude public firms for which profits are not a stated objective.
19For individuals with multiple jobs, only the main occupation is considered.
20We exclude from the original sample the extreme observations of the annual salary, i.e. those
lower than the 1th percentile and higher than the 99th percentile of the salary distribution.
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current or receiving firm) in the data set within the 1996-2005 period. An important
challenge regarding this data set is that, because of changes of firms’ ownership, there
appears to be some false transitions in the data. To minimize miscoded transitions,
transitions involving more than 50 percent of the size of the same sending firm are
excluded from the final sample. Furthermore, because we want to focus on voluntary
transitions, we exclude from the sample of switchers those workers who changed jobs
after a firm closure. In total, our sample includes 479, 161 yearly observations of
357, 487 job switchers (i.e. 10 percent of the original sample) and approximately 17, 000
firms. The second sample excludes the switchers and consists of 4, 658, 374 observations,
617, 513 “stayers” and nearly 18, 000 firms.
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics for both samples separately according to gender,
measured at both the worker and firm levels.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
The average male job switcher is 39 years of age and has 16 years of experience,
whereas the average female job switcher is 38 years of age and has 14 years of expe-
rience. The average tenure for both women and men is approximately three years.
The majority of workers have secondary or post-secondary diplomas, and 6 percent of
male job changers have at least a university degree, whereas 30 percent have completed
only primary education. In addition, 7 percent of female job changers have at least
a university degree, and 37 percent have a primary education. Most men and women
are classified as blue-collar workers (72 percent), followed by middle managers (24-26
percent). Significantly more male switchers have managerial jobs compared with their
female counterparts (4 percent versus 2 percent, respectively). For both genders, ap-
proximately 5 percent are foreigners, nearly 15 percent have at least one child at 0-3
years of age, and approximately 4 percent have at least one parent working as a man-
ager at the time of the job transition or before. Hence, 4-5 percent of job switchers
have what we refer to as a“family network” (i.e. having at least one parent employed
as a manager). In comparison, the average stayer is approximately two years older
and has two more years of tenure, with a slightly lower educational and occupational
level. The average stayer is also more likely to be married and less likely to have a
child between 0 and 3 years of age, regardless of the gender of the individual. The
percentage of foreigners is reasonably comparable across the two samples. During the
period covered by our sample, the wage of an average male and female job switcher was
approximately 250 and 200 thousand Danish Krones, respectively, or approximately 34
and 26 thousand Euros per annum, respectively. The salary of an average stayer was
approximately 10 percent above that figure. Turning to the firm-level characteristics,
we find that the average firm size is fairly similar across the two samples, although
the share of white-collar women and profits per worker are higher in the sample of
switchers, regardless of the gender of the employee.
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Table 2 includes the mean of the main outcome-dependent variables used in our
empirical analysis. For the sample of job switchers, we calculate an indicator function
that takes the value of one (zero) if a worker moves to a receiving firm that is of
higher (lower) quality than the sending firm. The quality of firms instead is primarily
defined in terms of their profits. Given that the measure of profits is firm-specific and
might be affected by measurement error, we calculate a set of indicator variables that
are based on alternative improvements in profits (i.e. the profit differential between
sending and receiving firms is at least either 5 or 10 percent). The means of these
outcome variables, also reported in Table 2, allow us to conclude that women have
higher probabilities of moving to a receiving firm of higher quality, regardless of the
definition of firm quality that we utilize.21 In addition, for the sample of stayers, we
examine the probability of promotion to a higher occupational level and to a managerial
position; these probabilities are additional outcome variables. It turns out that women
are generally less likely to be promoted than men.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Interesting evidence of wage gaps between men and women in the sample period is
reported in Figure 1. Examining the wage development of stayers and switchers (Panel
1(a)), we can observe that whereas a somehow decreasing gender wage gap characterizes
the latter category of workers, the former group presents a stable wage differential
between men and women over time. More importantly, the wage developments have
almost identical slopes across gender, suggesting that men’s and women’s career profiles
are very likely to start with very similar initial conditions and quality of matches at
the beginning of their career. A clearer picture of the different wage patterns between
stayers and switchers can be drawn when plotting wage developments by education
and by occupation (Panels 1(b) and 1(c)). Women earn substantially less than their
male peers in both worker categories, but differences are particularly marked for the
sample of stayers.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Thus, our prima facie evidence suggests that more productive women tend to switch
workplaces with the aim of achieving higher wages and promotion rates. Female stayers
are instead more prone to accept larger and persistent wage differentials over their
careers, irrespectively of their educational and occupational level.22
21Alternative indicators identified are calculated on the basis of past average profitability, profit
measures per worker, firms’ value added in levels and per worker and firms’ total factor productivity
(TFP, henceforth). Firm’s TFP is separately estimated for each two-digit industry using the algorithm
suggested by (Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer, 2006), as in Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012). The results
obtained from these alternative outcome-dependent variables will be reported in the Web Appendix
together with their means.
22To check that this evidence is not mainly driven by the gender composition, in the Web Appendix
we plot the shares of women and men across working population age and over time for stayers and
switchers). Gender composition of the workforce is fairly stable for differently aged workers and
increases over time.
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4.3 Institutional Background
As institutional constraints may hamper the degree of assortativeness and sorting in
job-to-job transitions in the labor market, we outline the main features of the Danish
labor market, which are represented by the combination of high flexibility and social
security, the role of family-friendly policies and decentralized wage settings.
Cornerstones of the Danish “flexicurity” model are a high level of labor mobility and
generous social security schemes. In particular, the absence of severance pay legislation
lowers hiring and firing costs, reduces frictions in the labor market and facilitates the
efforts of firms to adjust the quality and size of their workforce. Moreover, although
workers are not protected by stringent employment rules, they bear relatively low
costs of changing employers and have easy access to unemployment insurance or social
assistance benefits. In fact, Danish replacement ratios are among the most generous in
the world. Therefore, a notable part of the observed labor mobility is also associated
with wage mobility (Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2009).
A further key feature of the Danish labor market is the wide coverage of publicly
provided childcare, which, combined with the length and flexibility of parental leave
schemes, has favored female labor market participation and full-time employment with-
out dramatic consequences on the fertility rate (OECD, 2005). In fact, Denmark and
the other Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have traditionally
been considered forerunners in designing family-friendly policies. In these countries,
female participation has been correlated with the expansion of the welfare state. While
initially many of the jobs held by women have been part-time occupations in the public
sector, today a notable proportion of women is employed in the private sector and works
full-time. Manning and Saidi (2010) find that gender differences in attitude towards
competition do not explain much of the gender gaps in the UK. Nonetheless, descrip-
tive statistics show that women in the private sector earn a 5 percent higher wage
and are slightly more educated compared to their counterparts in the public sector.
These statistics may suggest that the sample used in this study is a relatively selected
one, consisting of slightly more motivated and career-oriented women. Therefore any
indication of glass-ceiling or sticky-floor phenomena obtained from this study should
be interpreted as a lower bound evidence.
For the purposes of our analysis, a brief description of wage bargaining in the Danish
private sector is important. Similar to other OECD countries, Denmark experienced a
shift in wage bargaining from a highly centralized system to a considerably decentral-
ized system. Since the early 1980s, an increasing share of wage bargaining descended
to the firm (individual employee) level, which increased the weight of employer and
employee roles in the resulting internal firm wage structure. As found in Shaw and
Lazear (2008), the within-firm wage variability in Denmark represents more than 80
percent of the total variability observed among all workers.
Given the key characteristics of the Danish institutions, we can reasonably affirm
that the evidence of gender gap outcomes arising from our empirical analysis may
present strong external validity because they may be lower-bound estimates of male-
vs-female sorting in the labor market.
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5 Results
Given the large volume of results, we discuss them in two separate sub-sections. The
first sub-section describes the main results of sorting in job-to-job transitions and pro-
motion patterns, while the second sub-section discusses some complementary analysis
and alternative specifications. Each sub-section complements the other one and pro-
vides support for the proposition that female workers encounter glass ceilings in some
firms.
5.1 Main Results
The first prediction of our theoretical model is that, conditional on observables, the
probability of leaving the current firm is high for workers with low and high wages,
while it is lower for workers that are ranked neither too high nor too low in the wage
distribution of the firm. Furthermore, such probability should be higher for women, for
whom outside options are more attractive. Hence, we plot the probability of leaving
the current firm for men and women as a function of the residual estimated from
a mincerian log-wage equation in a given firm. The results are reported in Figure
2, which yields support for both predictions. In particular, we find that high wages
increase the probability of leaving the firm to a higher extent than low wages, and this
is particularly true for female workers.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
The U-shape of job-to-job mobility resembles the relationship found for occupa-
tional mobility by Groes et al. (conditionally accepted). An interesting difference is
that we find a more asymmetric relationship: high earners are more likely to quit than
low earners. This is consistent with the existence of skill-requirements: learning occurs
only if workers are qualified enough.
In order to further understand such mobility patterns, we now investigate which
workers are more likely to move to a better firm conditional on leaving the firm, and
which workers are more likely to be promoted conditional on staying in the current
firm, again depending on the residuals of a mincerian log-wage equation. In line with
our theoretical framework, Figure 3 shows that workers that switch firm are more
likely to move to a better firm the higher their rank in the sending firm. Furthermore,
good female workers are more likely to leave the current firm. The relationship is
significantly stronger for female workers than for male workers. Similar results are
valid for promotions, as shown in Figure 4, although in that case good male workers
are more likely to be promoted than good female workers.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 around here]
This strongly indicates that women switch firms because they are less likely to
pursue career advancements within the current firm. In order to understand why these
patterns emerge, we now present the results of the estimation of linear probability
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model (6). This approach has the advantage to allow for an analysis of the different
factors driving gender differences in sorting and how they change for different sub-
samples of the population.
The main results pertaining to job-to-job transitions to better firms are reported
in the upper panel of Table 3. The first two columns of Table 3 include the baseline
results with and without a gender-wage interaction term. In both cases, there is a
significantly positive association between the logarithm of the past wage that was
earned in the previous firm and the probability of moving to a better firm, conditional
on moving to another firm. Our results are consistent with the findings of Bagger,
Sørensen and Vejlin (2013), who document a strong trend of positive assortative wage
sorting in Denmark, largely driven by high-wage workers being increasingly likely to
transition to high-wage firms.23 This confirms the appropriateness of our theoretical
framework. Hence, we can now turn our attention on the other empirical predictions.
Interestingly, although on average women are as likely as men to move to better
firms, they display a substantially stronger tendency toward positive sorting in job-to-
job transitions than men, as indicated by the estimated coefficient on the interaction
term. These empirical associations suggest that better ranked women are more likely
to move to companies that are characterized by higher profits than in less profitable
companies with respect to men. Additional results not reported in this table indicate
that transitions to better firms are more likely for workers who are married, parents
or native citizens, or for those who hold tertiary education. The relationship with age
and tenure appears to be weak and insignificant; thus, there is limited evidence of the
hypothesis of biological differences proposed by Ichino and Moretti (2009), at least in
job-to-job transitions. Finally, having a parent with past managerial experience is not
found to be significantly correlated with sorting.
These coefficients could be biased as they are based on a restrictive model, where
the estimated associations of the other explanatory variables do not vary across gender.
Hence, to appropriately account for gender heterogeneity and to appropriately test the
empirical predictions of our theoretical framework, we run separate regressions for
women and men (reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 3). As predicted,
we observe notable differences in sorting patterns in favor of women. Furthermore,
hypothesis testing that is reported in the table confirms that the coefficient that is
associated with women lagged wages is statistically higher than that associated with
men wages for job-to-job transitions, while it is lower for promotions.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Our estimates show that there is a general positive sorting in job-to-job transitions
tendency between workers which is stronger for women than for men and it is interesting
to note that the share of white-collar women in the sending firms has opposite effects in
the two sub-samples: this share decreases the probability of moving for female workers,
whereas it increases the corresponding probability for men. Overall, there appears to
be little support for the classical version of the glass ceiling hypothesis, which would
imply that positive sorting is weaker for women than for men in all transitions.
23A similar trend has been documented for Germany by Card, Heining and Kline (2013).
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Let us now turn our attention to career advancements within the firm (bottom part
of Table 3). Again, we find a general positive relationship between the lagged wage of a
stayer and her probability of being promoted.24 Being a woman reduces the conditional
probability of promotion, and the parameter of the interaction between past wages and
the female dummy is significantly negative.
This evidence is in line with our theoretical model and is able to account for the
fact that better female workers that face difficulties in career advancements in their
current firm are more likely to search and then move to better firms.
These findings regarding the gender differences in promotions are confirmed when
we separately investigate sorting in promotion for the sample of men and women.
Interestingly, a greater share of women is associated with an average higher conditional
probability for both women and men. This correlation suggests that the share of female
workers per se is not an indication of unbiased promotion policies.
Furthermore, gender differences in promotions in favor of men persist and are similar
in all firms when we focus on large career advancements (i.e. promotions to positions
at the managerial level), which provides evidence of the sticky floor hypothesis (see
Table 4). These results pertaining to promotions also qualify the findings according
to which the share of white-collar women in sending firms has a negative correlation
with the probability of moving to a better firm for women: because women are more
likely to be promoted in female-friendly firms, i.e. firms with many white-collar female
workers, they are less likely to seek a job elsewhere if the sending firm is female-friendly.
Furthermore, men have fewer incentives to seek a job outside of their current firm,
especially in non-female-friendly firms, and this lack of incentives drives the stronger
positive sorting for women in job-to-job transitions.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Overall, the set of empirical results we presented so far are consistent with the
view that women do not have better non-market opportunities, which differs from the
assumptions of Lazear and Rosen (1990), as women’s career advancement opportunities
do not appear to be better than those of men (they are less likely to be promoted and are
more likely to move to a better firm when career advancements are not too difficult to
achieve). In fact, the evidence on gender differences in promotion suggests that women
who cannot climb the occupational ladder within a firm because of discriminating
promotion policies attempt to overcome these gender barriers by searching for better
jobs offered by fairer firms in which they can pursue small career advancements.25 By
contrast, greater career advancements tend to be easier for men than for women in all
firms, as we will see in the next section.
24Although the coefficients are not reported in the table, a worker’s native status, marital sta-
tus, higher education and family networks are also positively associated with the likelihood of being
promoted conditional on staying at the same firm.
25Indeed, we will identify in the data such firms in the analysis below.
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5.2 Robustness Checks
While the main results are consistent with empirical predictions of the theoretical
framework we propose, in this section we further provide evidence of the robustness
of the sorting patterns we have just highlighted, and of the mechanisms that generate
them.
Alternative Definitions of Job-to-job Transitions. Our results for job-to-job
transitions are not sensitive to the particular definition of firm quality we used (i.e.
firms with profits at least five percent higher than one’s previous firm).
We address this issue in different ways. First, we strengthen the conditions on
profits by defining a transition to a better firm as a transition to a firm whose profits
are at least 10 percent higher than profits of the sending enterprise. The results are
reported in the first two columns of the upper panel of Table ?? and they corroborate
the findings of the main specification.
As a further robustness check to our analysis on job-to-job transitions, we restrict
the definition of job-to-job transitions to a better firm to observe how the results change.
Specifically, if we impose the condition that switchers also earn higher wages after a
transition to a better firm (last two columns of the upper panel of Table ??), then the
gender difference in sorting is observed to be stronger than in the baseline model.
Furthermore, we separately study transitions to the same or to a better occupational
level. The results show that the transitions to the same occupational level are those
with stronger gender differences in sorting across firms. This finding is in line with the
fact that small career advancements for women are easier than more significant career
advancements lending additional support to the sticky floor hypothesis (Booth et al.,
2003).
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 5 are obtained using: aver-
age profits over the sample period; past profits that were made before the job-to-job
transition occurred; total factor productivity; profits per worker; value added; transi-
tions without periods of unemployment between jobs; all transitions, including those
motivated by a firm’s demise; transition to better firms, but to the same occupational
level; transition to the same and to a different industry. Furthermore, we replace the
past log of the level of wage that was earned with employee fixed effects that are es-
timated from a gender-specific wage equation a` la AKM. The findings reveal that the
conditional probability of being recruited by a better firm is also positively correlated
with worker fixed effects, and as in the main specification, this correlation is stronger
for women, implying that both the sign of sorting and the gender effect are confirmed
when using the alternative definition of worker rankings suggested by AKM.26
Firm Exit. Quite interestingly, when we focus solely on transitions from a firm’s
closure (last two bottom columns of Table 5), we find gender differences in sorting
26The results obtained from these alternative definitions of firm’s quality and of the dependent
variable are reported in the on-line Appendix.
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in job-to-job transitions in favor of men (although not always significant), as these
mobility patterns do not completely reflect the voluntary choices and career concerns
of employees. Indeed, in that situation, men are also forced to seek jobs outside of their
current firms. These results lend additional support to our theoretical framework, since
the latter predicts that gender differences in sorting in favor of women should emerge
only when we consider voluntary transitions.
Results by Cohort. Given the potential bias due to the changes in age composition
of the workforce population under analysis over the sample period, we analyzed gender
differences in sorting selecting workers aged 25-30, 30-40, 40-50, or 50-60 in 1995 and
following them separately along the sample period.
In Table 6 we present results by cohorts for switchers involved in job-to-job transi-
tions. There, we find strong positive sorting parameters for women and large differences
between genders for younger cohorts (25-20; 30-40), while weak evidence of sorting is
found for workers 40-50 years old. Negative or negligible parameters are found for
women and men in the oldest age cohorts. These results, together with the gender-
specific wage developments reported in Figure 1, allow us to rule out the surmise that
the gender differences in sorting patterns found in the main analysis are merely driven
by a gap in the initial conditions across gender, due to a higher extent of mismatches
at the beginning of women’s career compared to their male counterparts. However,
the case of switchers aged 50-60 is very peculiar because a large share of this workers
was likely approaching early-retirement, which at that time was strongly supported by
generous public programs.27
[Insert Table 6 around here]
Table 7 instead investigates the promotion probability of stayers by cohorts for men
and women, separately. Running separate regressions for each age cohort, we find that
parameters on the previous wage are similar between men and women for the youngest
cohort but they start diverging and enlarging sensibly with the individuals’ cohort ages:
the coefficient for males is twice (one and a half) larger than the one for females for
the cohort 50-60 (40-50).
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Table 8 looks at promotions to managerial level: gender differences are significant
in all cohorts, although the probability of getting promoted for men is much higher
for better workers when we look at older cohorts. Hence, contrary to the biological
differences hypothesis, sticky floors turn out to actually be stronger for experienced
workers.
27Voluntary early retirement pensions were easily accessed before 1999. Since the introduction of a
labor market policy program for early retirement in 1979, the transition from ordinary full-time jobs
to retirement was facilitated. Workers had the possibility of retiring without having to fulfil formal
health requirements (Larsen and Pedersen, 2008). This scheme was adopted during a period of high
unemployment to accommodate young workers on the labor market.
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[Insert Table 8 around here]
Results by age. The discrepancies between men and women in job-to-job transitions
are confirmed in the sub-samples that refer to three age groups: under 35, between
35 and 50, and above 50 (Table 9). Positive sorting is stronger for women and gender
differences in sorting seem to enlarge with age.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
As already emerged in the analysis by cohort, considering the results on promotions
to better occupation by age group, in Table 10 we find that the discrepancy in the
sorting parameter increases with the age of workers. Since this difference is in favor
of men, the pattern appears to be consistent with the idea that women tend to climb
the career ladder at a slow pace than men; hence, women exhibit an increasing gap
with respect to men. This pattern lowers a woman’s probability of reaching top-level
positions at a given age.28
[Insert Table 10 around here]
Overall, the analysis by age groups and cohorts yields limited support to the hy-
pothesis that biological differences explain gender gaps, as found in the case study by
Ichino and Moretti (2009). Indeed, while gender differences are more important when
career advancements mostly take place, i.e. for workers aged between 35 and 50 years,
in line with our baseline results, such differences are in favor of women in job-to-job
transitions, and in favor of men in promotions.
Female-friendliness of Firms. Our theoretical framework presumes the existence
of certain firms that have no, or smaller, gender biases in promotions. We will now
investigate if such firms indeed exist.
We will look at female-friendly firms, defined as companies characterized by a large
share of women in white-collar positions, i.e. higher than the industrial median. Fur-
thermore, we define “female-sought” firms as female-friendly firms that are destinations
in the job-to-job transition of at least one female worker coming form a worse firm.
Table 11 shows that the sorting parameter in job-to-job transitions to female
friendly firms is larger. Hence, the stronger positive sorting for female job switchers is
mainly due to transitions to female-friendly firms.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
We now investigate whether gender unbiased promotion policies in such firms are
the determinants of these flows. First of all, note that, in line with this interpretation,
there are smaller and less significant differences between genders in terms of transitions
to firms which are not female-friendly.
28The analysis by age groups of promotions to managerial occupations yields similar results. It is
available in the on-line appendix.
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Furthermore, we find evidence that the strength of positive sorting in promotions
is stronger for women when we examine promotions to a higher occupational level in
female oriented firms, i.e. female-friendly and female-sought firms (Table 12). On
the contrary, the difference is consistent with the baseline results, but stronger, in
firms that are not sought after by females. These findings strongly indicate that good
female workers seek career advancements in female-friendly firms because promotion
opportunities in these firms do not depend on gender.
[Insert Table 12 around here]
Nonetheless, gender differences in favor of men for promotions to managerial po-
sitions seems to emerge in all firms, providing further support for the sticky floor
hypothesis (Table 12).
[Insert Table 13 around here]
According to our empirical strategy, female-friendly firms are by construction more
profitable than sending firms. We explicitly test the correlation between profitability
and female-friendliness by estimating a productivity equation with fixed effects and
several control variables, among others a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm
is “female-sought”. We find in fact a positive and significant correlation between non-
discrimination and firm profitability, as reported in Table 14.29
[Insert Table 14 around here]
Parenthood. Parenthood per se does not appear to be relevant to job-to-job transi-
tions. Indeed, not only do gender differences in sorting emerge for both workers with
and without children and for workers both before and after the first child, but the
coefficients are also similar in all these sub-samples.30
Yet, Table 15 reports the results by firm type (female-, not female-friendly, female-
and not female-sought companies) for the sub-samples before and after the first child is
born. Interestingly, female-friendly firms show no gender differences for promotions to
better occupations before the first child is born, while a small bias in favor of females
emerge after the first child is born. However, women who work in other firms encounter
a significant penalty in promotions, especially after bearing a child.
[Insert Table 15 around here]
Looking at promotions to managerial positions, again gender differences appear in
all firms independently on parenthood. However, the penalty of parenthood seems to
be harsher in not female-sought and not female-friendly after the first child is born.
29A reason behind this finding is that wage gaps resulting from poor matching opportunities of
disadvantaged workers may induce those firms that employ these workers to adopt suboptimal tech-
nologies. Indeed, Merlino (2012) shows that the interplay among matching opportunities and firms’
investments is crucial to understand gender gaps in unemployment and wages.
30These results are reported in the on-line Appendix since they are in line with the baseline results.
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[Insert Table 16 around here]
Overall, this set of results provides evidence of an interplay between motherhood
and the glass ceiling phenomenon in certain firms.
Further Checks. In an on-line appendix, we provide additional results that show
that the main findings are robust when we study workers with different educational
attainments, with or without family networks, employed in given sectors and in firms
of different sizes.
In particular, we show that gender gaps in job-to-job transitions emerge also when
we sub-sample by occupation and by education: men generally show weaker positive
sorting patterns in job-to-job transitions, and the difference between genders is larger
for blue-collar workers and for workers with primary education, whereas the difference
weakens for the more educated workers or for those with better occupations.
Manning (2003), Ch. 7, documents that women in the UK are more constrained
in their opportunities to change job. In order to understand how much the costs
associated with job mobility affect our results, we focus on transitions without a change
of residence and for single women, since for these samples we expect such costs to be
lower. In these cases, we find that sorting in job-to-job transitions is stronger for
women although slightly less than in baseline regression. This suggests that our main
results may not entirely depend on the costs associated with switching employer, but
rather on career concerns. Conversely, the reductions in the labor supply that are
represented by shifts from full-time to part-time employment are not associated with
positive sorting, as changes in the number of hours worked are likely to be triggered by
family considerations. Further, the finding that the sorting coefficient in movements
across firms is significantly higher for women with a family network might reflect the
importance of having good job contact networks for women.
Finally it does not appear to be relevant whether firms conduct business in the same
industry or in a different industry relative to that of the sending firm, stressing that
the results are not driven by women self-selecting themselves in particular industries.31
Regarding promotions, we show that the results of the estimations that are con-
ducted separately by education interestingly suggest that gender differences in pro-
motion are lower for workers with mandatory and tertiary educations compared to
workers with secondary education. Results by industry indicate that the same pattern
generally emerges in all sectors.
To complement the description of the mechanisms driving such sorting patterns
provided in this paper, we have also examined the gender differences in transitions to
unemployment and self-employment, which are also reported in the on-line appendix.
The analysis of job-to-unemployment and job-to-self-employment transitions provides
31The fact that we find that differences in positive sorting in job-to-job transitions in favor of
females do not depend on firm size or industry lands additional support of this. The exceptions are
the construction sector, which is not a female-oriented sector, and the financial and business services
sector, in which the degree of positive sorting for men is closer to that for women, in line with the
findings of Ngai and Petrongolo (2014) for the US. All these additional results are reported in the
on-line appendix.
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evidence of significant differences between men and women with respect to the propen-
sity to become self-employed or to experience open unemployment in favor of women.
Our results reveal a generally lower willingness of employers to retain women compared
with men, especially with respect to women who work in firms that are not female-
oriented and who have had at least one child. These findings suggest that women have
fewer career opportunities than men in such firms.
Overall, our empirical evidence generally suggests that the degree of positive sorting
is higher for women than for men in voluntary job-to-job transitions. However, this
result does not hold for all types of transitions and women, as their degree of sorting
may be severely affected by the extent of career advancements, reductions in the labor
supply and attitudes toward female workers in receiving firms. These findings may
initially appear puzzling, as they do not appear to support any well-known theory of
gender gaps in the labor market and do not seem to be consistent with gender gaps
in the labor market. Examining promotion patterns more closely though help us to
clarify the reasons and mechanisms behind these gender differences in sorting.
Indeed, the higher degree of positive sorting for females in job-to-job transitions
is consistent with the finding that strong female workers experience glass ceilings in
the average firm; hence, such women pursue (mild) career advancements in firms with
lower glass ceilings for women.
These gender differences in sorting are widely consistent also with an overall gender
gap in labor market outcomes and an under-representation of women in top positions,
as observed in the case of Denmark, which should be even more severe in countries
with less flexible labor markets.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we measure sorting in different labor market transitions for female and
male workers using Danish employer-employee matched data to study how gender gaps
in labor market outcomes emerge. In particular, we study the relationship between a
worker’s ability, which is measured by one’s position in the wage hierarchy of the firm
for which (s)he works, and the probability of moving to a better firm or the probability
of being promoted.
The detailed account of gender differences that emerges provides support to the
hypothesis that female workers encounter glass ceilings in some firms, especially after
motherhood. This obstacle leads good female workers to seek firms that will reward
their talents in a fair manner. As a result, good female workers are more mobile than
male workers in the direction of better firms, but it is easier for good male workers to
be promoted in their firms. Nonetheless, gender differences in promotion persist and
are similar in all firms when we focus on large career advancements.
Our findings suggest that, although the Nordic model, which is characterized by
a flexible labor market and generous public family-friendly schemes, has succeeded in
maintaining a high rate of female employment, some unintended boomerang effects
appear to have emerged and impeded women who become mothers from progressing
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in their careers in firms that are not female-friendly. These hurdles may be associated
with the significant generosity of parental leave policies, as suggested by Datta Gupta,
Smith and Verner (2008) and Smith, Smith and Verner (2011). Thus, it is important
to conduct further research to determine why these effects emerge and why only in
some firms.
Finally, it would be interesting to study gender differences in occupational mobility
along the lines of Groes et al. (conditionally accepted), and to relate it to gender
differences on career advancements within and across firms. This is in our current
research agenda.
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Table 2: Mean of the main dependent variables
Statistics of dependent variables
Sample of switchers
Variables Women Men
Prob(profits of current firm>profits of
previous firm by 5%)
0.401 0.378
Prob(profits of current firm>profits of
previous firm by 10%)
0.356 0.349
Obs 126,676 294,073
All sample without observations with switching
Promotion (better occupation) 0.030 0.032
Promotion (manager) 0.033 0.035
Obs 1,329,800 2,773,928
Notes: All the dependent variables are expressed as time averages from 1995 to 2005.
Figure 2: Probability of switching firm as a function of the deviation of the residuals
in wages in the sending firm.
33
Figure 3: Probability of switching to a better firm as a function of the deviation of the
residuals in wages in the sending firm conditional on switching firm.
Figure 4: Probability of switching firm as a function of the deviation of the residuals
in wages in the current firm conditional on not switching firm.
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Table 3: Gender Differences in Sorting, main results
Sorting in job-to-job transitions
Total Total Women Men
log(wage sending) 0.009** 0.009** 0.016*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
female -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
log(wage sending)*female 0.002**
(0.001)
percentage of white-collar women
in sending firm
0.002*** 0.001*** -0.078*** 0.097***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
percentage of white-collar women
in receiving firm
0.002* 0.001* 0.062** 0.091
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 420,749 420,749 126,676 294,073
R-sq 0.127 0.127 0.124 0.130
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
- - 149.50; 0.000
Promotions
Total Total Women Men
log(wage sending) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
female -0.008*** -0.008*** - -
(0.001) (0.001) - -
log(wage sending)*female - -0.012*** - -
- (0.001) - -
share of white-collar women in the firm 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.780*** 0.676***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.039) (0.021)
N 4,103,728 4,103,728 1,329,800 2,773,928
R-sq 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.021
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
- - 110.78; 0.000
Notes: For job-to job transitions, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker moved to a firm whose profits
are at least 5% higher than those of the previous firm. For promotions, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the
worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational level. All specifications include age and age squared, tenure and tenure
squared, marital status, having children, education level, family network, a dummy for foreigners, experience and experience squared, firm
fixed effects, firm size dummies (both receiving and sending firm in the regressions regarding job-to-job transitions), year and occupational
dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically
significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4: Promotion to managerial occupation models estimated for all sample and
separately for men and women, main results
Total Women Men
log(wage sending) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.001*** -0.001*** - -
(0.000) (0.000) - -
log(wage sending)*female - -0.006*** - -
- (0.000) - -
share of white-collar women in the firm 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
N 4,103,728 4,103,728 1,329,800 2,773,928
R-sq 0.009 0.010 0.004 0.011
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
- - 323.27; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a managerial
occupational level. All specifications include age and age squared, tenure and tenure squared, marital status, having children, education level,
family network, a dummy for foreigners, experience and experience squared, firm fixed effects, size dummies of the receiving firm, and a full
set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the
individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 5: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women,
results by type of transitions
Profits > 10% With a wage improvement
Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
All Women Women Women
log(wage sending) 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
female -0.002
(0.001)
log(wage sending)*female 0.003***
(0.001)
N 420,749 126,676 50,943 50,943
R2 0.127 0.122 0.204 0.202
Men Men Men
log(wage sending) - 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.007***
- (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
N - 294,073 97,662 97,662
R2 - 0.130 0.169 0.171
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
- 67.72; 0.000 47.08; 0.000 22.44; 0.000
Transition to a better occupational level Transition from a firm exit
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N 17,520 17,520 26,083 26,083
R2 0.112 0.111 0.084 0.083
Men
log(wage sending) 0.003*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
N 39,878 39,878 57,820 54,904
R2 0.118 0.119 0.117 0.119
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
250.99; 0.000 5935.24; 0.000 11.05; 0.000 2.11; 0.146
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 6: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women,
results by cohort
Cohort 25-30 Cohort 30-40
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
N 2,876 2,876 3,679 3,679
R2 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.142
Men
log(wage sending) 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 11,124 11,124 16,982 16,982
R2 0.153 0.154 0.142 0.165
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
1046.97; 0.000 461.35; 0.000 92.37; 0.000 79.16; 0.000
Cohort 40-50 Cohort 50-60
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.020*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,945 1,945 630 630
R2 0.134 0.168 0.211 0.215
Men
log(wage sending) -0.001 0.003* -0.001*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
N 9,133 9,133 4,027 4,027
R2 0.129 0.131 0.123 0.121
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
8.49; 0.000 0.70; 0.402 683.65; 0.000 1047.55; 0.000
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 7: Promotion to better occupation models estimated separately for men and
women, results by cohort
Cohort 25-30 Cohort 30-40 Cohort 40-50 Cohort 50-60
Women
log(wage sending) 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.044***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 121,018 199,285 175,239 52,682
R2 0.025 0.030 0.033 0.032
Men
log(wage sending) 0.018*** 0.041*** 0.059*** 0.091***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
N 271,866 477,224 451,131 169,002
R2 0.024 0.037 0.047 0.062
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
0.01; 0.90 25.50; 0.000 34.18; 0.000 102.02; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and
a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at
the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
Table 8: Promotion to managerial occupation models estimated separately for men
and women, results by cohort
Cohort 20-30 Cohort 30-40 Cohort 40-50 Cohort 50-60
Women
log(wage sending) 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N 121,018 199,285 175,239 52,682
R2 0.004 0.015 0.011 0.007
Men
log(wage sending) 0.003*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
N 271,866 477,224 451,131 169,002
R2 0.005 0.025 0.024 0.035
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
15.09; 0.000 169.49; 0.000 123.23; 0.000 72.21; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a managerial
occupational level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner
status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size
dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm
level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 9: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women,
results by age
Under 35 years Between 35 and 50 years More than 50 years
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
N 60,289 60,289 51,052 51,052 15,335 15,335
R2 0.113 0.111 0.137 0.135 0.203 0.198
Men
log(wage sending) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 130,451 130,451 120,984 120,984 42,638 42,638
R2 0.130 0.131 0.131 0.164 0.156 0.157
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
58.33; 0.000 24.71; 0.000 321.64; 0.000 171.20; 0.000 18.36; 0.000 9.09; 0.003
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
Table 10: Promotion to better occupation models estimated separately for men and
women, results by age
Under 35 years Between 35 and 50 years More than 50 years
Women
log(wage sending) 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 444,075 619,177 233,307
R2 0.018 0.020 0.018
Men
log(wage sending) 0.007*** 0.028*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
N 823,517 1,277,564 596,934
R2 0.016 0.025 0.038
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
7.68; 0.005 78.41; 0.000 232.05; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and
a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at
the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 11: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women,
results based on female friendliness of firms
Transition to female-friendly firms Transition not to female-friendly firms
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
N 77,383 77,383 49,293 49,293
R2 0.098 0.095 0.165 0.162
Men
log(wage sending) 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
N 157,585 157,585 136,488 136,488
R2 0.109 0.107 0.150 0.153
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
27.51; 0.000 28.69; 0.000 0.02; 0.897 0.00; 0.94
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
Table 12: Promotion to better occupation models estimated separately for men and
women, results based on the female-friendliness of firms
Female-friendly firms Non-female-friendly firms Female-sought firms
Women
log(wage sending) 0.015*** 0.011** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
N 459,405 870,395 391,628
R2 0.019 0.009 0.027
Men
log(wage sending) 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
N 574,378 2,199,550 449,077
R2 0.023 0.022 0.033
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
31.57; 0.000 134.60; 0.000 62.82; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and
a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the
individual level. Female-friendly firms are those with a share of white-collar women that is higher than the industrial mean. Female-sought
firms only include the destination firms of the job to job transitions model, whose share of white-collar women is higher than the industrial
mean that hired at least one woman in the sorting model. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01
level.
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Table 13: Promotion to managerial occupation models estimated separately for men
and women, results based on the female-friendliness of firms
Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms Female-sought firms
Women
log(wage sending) 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 459,405 870,395 391,628
R2 0.005 0.003 0.005
Men
log(wage sending) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 574,378 2,199,550 449,077
R2 0.009 0.012 0.009
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
69.26; 0.000 376.79; 0.000 93.37; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a managerial
occupational level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner
status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size
dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm
level and at the individual level. Female-friendly firms are those with a share of white-collar women that is higher than the industrial mean.
Female-sought firms only include the destination firms of the job to job transitions model, whose share of white-collar women is higher than
the industrial mean that hired at least one woman in the sorting model. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and
***at the 0.01 level.
Table 14: Firm profitability and female-friendliness
FE(1) FE(2) FE(3)
Female-sought firm 0.034** 0.033** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
log of capital stock 0.027*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.004)
average age of employees 0.000
(0.001)
average tenure of employees 0.001
(0.002)
average experience of employees -0.002*
(0.001)
share of managers -0.040
(0.032)
share of middle managers -0.012
(0.014)
share of employees with secondary education 0.019*
(0.011)
share of employees with tertiary education -0.005
(0.030)
share of women 0.041
(0.071)
N 62,599 62,596 62,596
R2 0.013 0.014 0.025
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of profits per employee. All specifi-
cations include firm fixed effects, firm size dummies, and a full set of industry
and year dummies. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05
level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table 15: Promotion to better occupation models estimated separately for men and
women, results by female friendliness of firms before and after children
Before Child After Child
Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms
Women
log(wage sending) 0.001 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
N 26,911 45,141 50,562 85,368
R2 0.036 0.010 0.024 0.010
Men
log(wage sending) -0.002 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
N 35,508 117,046 64,697 210,860
R2 0.043 0.020 0.010 0.011
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
1.36; 0.243 23.75; 0.000 3.61; 0.091 27.12; 0.000
Before Child After Child
Female-sought Firms Not female-sought firms Female-sought Firms Not female-sought firms
Women
log(wage sending) 0.004 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.009
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001)
N 6,134 13,525 10,123 22,970
R2 0.026 0.020 0.009 0.007
Men
log(wage sending) 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
N 15,652 57,017 26,358 94,273
R2 0.033 0.014 0.023 0.012
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
5.92; 0.014 7.18; 0.007 6.59; 0.012 14.80; 0.000
Notes:The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level within the same firm. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared,
foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of
women and size and a full set of industry and year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. Female-friendly firms are those with a share of white-collar women higher than the industrial mean.
Female-sought firms only include the destination firms of the job to job transitions model whose share of white-collar women is higher than
the industrial mean that hired at least a woman in the sorting model. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, ***at the
0.01 level.
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Table 16: Promotion to managerial occupation models estimated separately for men
and women, results based on the female-friendliness of firms before and after children
Before Child After Child
Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms
Women
log(wage sending) 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 26,911 45,141 50,562 85,368
R2 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002
Men
log(wage sending) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
N 35,508 117,046 64,697 210,860
R2 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.004
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
2.74; 0.098 18.72; 0.000 4.77; 0.029 26.30; 0.000
Before Child After Child
Female-sought Firms Not female-sought firms Female-sought Firms Not female-sought firms
Women
log(wage sending) 0.004** 0.001*** 0.004** 0.001**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
N 6,134 13,525 10,123 22,970
R2 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.003
Men
log(wage sending) 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
N 15,652 57,017 26,358 94,273
R2 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.005
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
3.29; 0.069 51.43; 0.000 0.25; 0.61 8.90; 0.002
Notes:The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a managerial
occupational level within the same firm. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience
squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm
share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at the sending firm level and at the individual level. Female-friendly firms are those with a share of white-collar women that is higher than
the industrial mean. Female-sought firms only include the destination firms of the job to job transitions model, whose share of white-collar
women is higher than the industrial mean that hired at least one woman in the sorting model. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at
the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Abstract
This document provides additional results, which are complementary to those included in
“Gender Differences in Sorting”. See that paper for additional details on the estimation
strategy and the data used.
Figure A1: Share of stayers aged 25-60, by gender and by reference year (1996, 2000, 2003).
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Figure A2: Share of switchers aged 25-60, by gender and by reference year (1996, 2000,
2003).
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Source: Statistics Denmark.
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Table A4: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women,
results by other relevant types of transitions
Transition without unemployment All Transitions, including firm exit
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
N 79,670 79,670 152,759 152,759
R2 0.144 0.141 0.121 0.119
Men
log(wage sending) 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N 205,288 205,288 351,893 351,893
R2 0.130 0.131 0.129 0.129
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
22.09; 0.000 12.99; 0.000 34.16; 0.000 22.62; 0.000
Transition to the same occupational level
Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 93,058 93,058
R2 0.135 0.133
Men
log(wage sending) 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
N 219,002 219,002
R2 0.137 0.137
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
42.60; 0.000 27.44; 0.000
Transition within the same industry Transition to a different industry
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 67,265 67,265 59,411 59,411
R2 0.191 0.187 0.118 0.118
Men
log(wage sending) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
N 150,136 150,136 143,937 143,937
R2 0.154 0.156 0.135 0.135
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
39.59; 0.0001 21.45; 0.000 3899.32; 0.000 1115.45; 0.000
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A5: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women,
results on parenthood
With child (0-3 years) Without child (0-3 years)
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 18,875 18,875 107,801 107,801
R2 0.121 0.119 0.125 0.123
Men
log(wage sending) 0.003 -0.000 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001)
N 43,603 43,603 250,470 250,470
R2 0.125 0.126 0.132 0.132
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
97.33; 0.000 77.97; 0.000 129.24; 0.000 45.05; 0.000
Before child (0-3 years) After child (0-3 years)
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
N 6,025 6,025 11,135 11,135
R2 0.119 0.120 0.109 0.104
Men
log(wage sending) -0.006** -0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
N 12,893 12,893 27,196 20,642
R2 0.126 0.126 0.120 0.119
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
43.42; 0.000 40.09; 0.000 97.32; 0.000 245.97; 0.000
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A6: Promotion to better occupation models estimated separately for men and
women, results on parenthood
With child (0-3 years) Without child (0-3 years)
Women
log(wage sending) 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.002)
N 162,340 1,167,460
R2 0.017 0.019
Men
log(wage sending) 0.018*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003)
N 342,542 2,431,386
R2 0.018 0.021
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
15.15; 0.000 201.90; 0.000
Before Child (0-3 years) After Child (0-3 years)
Women
log(wage sending) 0.006** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001)
N 78,115 146,166
R2 0.023 0.016
Men
log(wage sending) 0.011*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
N 171,490 306,772
R2 0.025 0.013
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
19.15; 0.000 12.76; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and
a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual
level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A7: Sorting models estimated separately for men and women, results by occu-
pation and education
Blue-collar Middle manager Manager
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.010** 0.009*** -0.019*** -0.021***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 90,657 90,657 32,879 32,879 3,140 3,140
R2 0.134 0.131 0.107 0.107 0.153 0.155
Men
log(wage sending) 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N 211,574 211,574 70,337 70,337 12,162 12,162
R2 0.144 0.144 0.099 0.099 0.107 0.108
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
32.89; 0.000 16.10; 0.000 80.62; 0.000 162.40; 0.000 65.62; 0.000 66.02; 0.111
Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
N 46,325 46,325 71,088 71,088 9,263 9,263
R2 0.152 0.148 0.113 0.111 0.110 0.110
Men
log(wage sending) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 88,325 88,325 210,720 210,720 16,478 16,355
R2 0.156 0.157 0.125 0.124 0.112 0.112
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
25.75; 0.000 23.55; 0.000 7852.27; 0.000 545.36; 0.000 0.13; 0.715 24.95; 0.000
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A8: Sorting models estimated separately for men and women, results by relevant
individual characteristics
With family network Without family network
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 6,298 6,298 120,378 120,378
R2 0.110 0.109 0.125 0.123
Men
log(wage sending) 0.006*** -0.012*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 12,074 12,074 281,999 318,777
R2 0.113 0.112 0.131 0.131
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
4185.57; 0.000 4733.67; 0.000 80.44; 0.000 35.19; 0.000
Married or cohabiting Single
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
N 93,682 93,682 32,994 32,994
R2 0.127 0.125 0.113 0.113
Men
log(wage sending) 0.005*** 0.003* 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
N 215,210 215,210 78,863 110,191
R2 0.129 0.129 0.133 0.133
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
75.23; 0.000 54.04; 0.000 1.21; 0.270 2.53; 0.112
Transition without change in residence From full to part-time
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.014*** 0.012*** -0.013 -0.021**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.009)
N 50,519 56,617 2,739 2,739
R2 0.104 0.104 0.114 0.116
Men
log(wage sending) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002* -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
N 117,687 131,864 5,916 5,916
R2 0.129 0.129 0.108 0.109
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
183.47; 0.000 161.12; 0.000 5.31; 0.021 5.51; 0.018
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A9: Sorting models estimated separately for men and women, results by the size
of sending firm and the industry of the receiving firm
Firm size: 20-49 employees Firm size: 50-99 employees Firm size: more than 99 employees
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.046*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
N 17,737 17,737 14,164 14,164 94,775 94,775
R2 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.048 0.046
Men
log(wage sending) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
N 55,371 55,371 40,776 40,776 197,926 197,926
R2 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.025
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
173.28; 0.000 301.51; 0.000 10.11; 0.001 48.35; 0.000 16.68; 0.000 11.48; 0.0000
Manufacturing Construction Wholesale trade
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.006*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 47,442 47,442 3,031 3,031 36,664 36,664
R2 0.126 0.125 0.138 0.138 0.111 0.108
Men
log(wage sending) -0.007*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 122,483 122,483 47,678 47,678 55,086 55,086
R2 0.136 0.136 0.148 0.151 0.109 0.118
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
5507.74; 0.000 876.23; 0.000 513.18; 0.000 1154.56; 0.000 0.00; 0.95 1.16; 0.281
Transport Business and financial All firms, including those with fewer than 20 employees
Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10% Profits > 5% Profits > 10%
Women
log(wage sending) 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.019** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
N 20,659 20,659 18,826 18,826 147,861 147,861
R2 0.560 0.563 0.083 0.084 0.172 0.167
Men
log(wage sending) 0.015* 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
N 38,326 38,326 29,985 29,985 361,370 361,370
R2 0.435 0.438 0.087 0.086 0.191 0.189
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
57.54; 0.000 32.51; 0.000 3.98; 0.046 40.35; 0.000 54.26; 0.000 28.93; 0.000
Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the
receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending
firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A10: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by
education
Promotion to Better Occupation Promotion to Manager
Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education
Women
log(wage sending) 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
N 511,358 733,429 85,013
R2 0.016 0.018 0.005
Men
log(wage sending) 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
N 814,927 1,807,806 151,195
R2 0.014 0.021 0.021
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
575.96; 0.000 51.92; 0.000 89.51; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital
status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and
a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at
the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
Table A11: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by age
and for promotions to a managerial occupation
Under 35 years Between 35 and 50 years More than 50 years
Women
log(wage sending) 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
N 444,075 619,177 233,307
R2 0.002 0.005 0.005
Men
log(wage sending) 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
N 823,517 1,277,564 596,934
R2 0.005 0.013 0.017
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
60.12; 0.000 228.51; 0.000 262.91; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a managerial
occupation. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status,
marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies,
and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and
at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A12: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by
industry of receiving firm and for promotions to better occupation
Promotion to Better Occupation
Manufacturing Construction Wholesale trade
Women
log(wage sending) 0.013*** 0.011** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N 706,707 42,458 321,492
R2 0.020 0.027 0.026
Men
log(wage sending) 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N 1,541,641 361,461 480,817
R2 0.029 0.017 0.037
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
303.66; 0.000 12.96; 0.000 216.15; 0.000
Promotion to Better Occupation
Transport Business and financial
Women
log(wage sending) 0.023*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
N 69,372 188,807
R2 0.018 0.013
Men
log(wage sending) 0.016*** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.002)
N 157,717 301,871
R2 0.010 0.011
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
54.13; 0.000 20.39; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level within the same firm. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared,
foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of
women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A13: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by
industry of receiving firm and for promotions to a managerial occupation
Promotion to Managerial Occupation
Manufacturing Construction Wholesale trade
Women
log(wage sending) 0.005*** 0.003** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 706,707 42,458 321,492
R2 0.028 0.006 0.026
Men
log(wage sending) 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 1,541,641 361,461 480,817
R2 0.015 0.010 0.037
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
303.66; 0.000 13.76; 0.000 118.21; 0.000
Promotion to Managerial Occupation
Transport Business and financial
Women
log(wage sending) 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 69,372 188,807
R2 0.001 0.004
Men
log(wage sending) 0.002*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 157,717 301,871
R2 0.002 0.003
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
4.42; 0.035 62.13; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational
level within the same firm. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared,
foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of
women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A14: Unemployment probability estimated for the full sample and separately for
men and women, main results
Total Women Men
log(wage sending) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female 0.004*** 0.004*** - -
(0.000) (0.000) - -
log(wage sending)*female - 0.001*** - -
- (0.000) - -
age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2/1000 -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.051***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
tenure -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tenure2/1000 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.398*** 0.300***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
percentage of white-collar women in the firm 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
child 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
secondary -0.000** -0.000** 0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tertiary -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
married -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
foreigner 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.000 0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
family network -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
N 4,103,728 4,103,728 1,329,800 2,773,928
R-sq 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.022
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
- - 187.29; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is unem-
ployed. All specifications include experience and experience squared, previous firm fixed effects,
size dummies of the previous firm, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual
level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A15: Unemployment probability estimated separately for men and women, re-
sults by age and education
Under 35 years Between 35 and 50 years More than 50 years
Women
log(wage sending) -0.002*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N 560,410 581,684 278,926
R2 0.024 0.024 0.013
Men
log(wage sending) -0.007*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 971,596 1,132,303 633,208
R2 0.025 0.029 0.017
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
56.11; 0.000 56.15; 0.000 14.21; 0.000
Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education
Women
log(wage sending) 0.0001 -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N 607,138 731,199 82,683
R2 0.020 0.019 0.016
Men
log(wage sending) -0.006*** -0.019*** -0.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 915,364 1,682,173 139,570
R2 0.025 0.022 0.012
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
93.50; 0.000 69.21; 0.000 0.78; 0.377
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is unemployed. All specifications include age, age squared,
tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a
family network dummy, previous firm fixed effects, previous firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at
the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A16: Unemployment probability estimated separately for men and women: re-
sults by other relevant subgroups
Married or cohabiting Single Without child (0-3 years)
Women
log(wage sending) -0.011*** 0.003** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,038,848 382,172 1,264,916
R2 0.018 0.023 0.017
Men
log(wage sending) -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,953,677 783,430 2,428,391
R2 0.017 0.027 0.021
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
92.45; 0.000 85.65; 0.000 259.04; 0.000
With child (0-3 years) Before child (0-3 years) After child (0-3 years)
Women
log(wage sending) -0.015*** -0.001*** -0.0006***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 156,104 73,882 121,069
R2 0.026 0.081 0.017
Men
log(wage sending) -0.017*** -0.0007** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 308,716 151,837 248,634
R2 0.024 0.082 0.012
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
2.08; 0.149 7.80; 0.005 23.43; 0.000
Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms
Women
log(wage sending) -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 809,456 611,564
R2 0.016 0.021
Men
log(wage sending) -0.010*** -0.014***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 1,216,789 1,520,318
R2 0.019 0.023
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
40.54; 0.000 175.22; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is unemployed. All specifications include age, age squared,
tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a
family network dummy, previous firm fixed effects, previous firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies.
Female-friendly firms are those with a share of white-collar women that is higher than the industrial mean. The standard errors are reported
in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05
level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A17: Self-employment probability estimated for full sample and separately for
men and women, main results
Total Women Men
log(wage sending) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.004*** -0.004*** - -
(0.000) (0.000) - -
log(wage sending)*female - 0.002*** - -
- (0.000) - -
age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2/1000 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
tenure -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tenure2/1000 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.025*** 0.053***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
percentage of white-collar women in the firm -0.003 -0.002 0.004** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
child 0.000** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
secondary 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tertiary 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
married -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
foreigner -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
family network 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 4,103,728 4,103,728 1,329,800 2,773,928
R-sq 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
- - 51.52; 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is self-
employed. All specifications include experience and experience squared, previous firm fixed effects,
size dummies of the previous firm, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual
level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A18: Self-employment probability estimated separately for men and women,
results by age and education
Under 35 years Between 35 and 50 years More than 50 years
Women
log(wage sending) -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 523,574 704,971 320,566
R2 0.001 0.001 0.002
Men
log(wage sending) -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 945,720 1,405,932 785,174
R2 0.003 0.003 0.003
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
19.75; 0.000 23.67; 0.000 1.72; 0.1898
Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education
Women
log(wage sending) -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 598,157 852,428 98,526
R2 0.001 0.001 0.002
Men
log(wage sending) -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 940,904 2,024,342 171,580
R2 0.003 0.003 0.003
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
17.38; 0.000 33.17; 0.000 3.42; 0.064
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is self-employed. All specifications include age, age squared,
tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a
family network dummy, previous firm fixed effects, previous firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant
at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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Table A19: Self-employment probability estimated separately for men and women:
results by other relevant subgroups
Married or cohabiting Single Without child (0-3 years)
Women
log(wage sending) -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,201,640 347,471 1,360,116
R2 0.001 0.002 0.001
Men
log(wage sending) -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 2,387,896 748,930 2,756,141
R2 0.003 0.003 0.003
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
61.22; 0.000 0.78; 0.377 37.80; 0.000
With child (0-3 years) Before child (0-3 years) After child (0-3 years)
Women
log(wage sending) -0.001*** 0.000 -0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 188,995 79,042 158,018
R2 0.001 0.027 0.015
Men
log(wage sending) -0.003*** 0.000 -0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 380,685 171,510 317,195
R2 0.003 0.016 0.007
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
11.69; 0.000 0.01; 0.9102 6.20; 0.013
Female-friendly firms Not female-friendly firms
Women
log(wage sending) -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 890,677 658,434
R2 0.001 0.001
Men
log(wage sending) -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 1,397,819 1,739,007
R2 0.002 0.004
Hypothesis test [χ2; p-value]:
αwomen1 = α
men
1
0.89; 0.345 56.80; 0.0001
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is self-employed. All specifications include age, age squared,
tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a
family network dummy, previous firm fixed effects, previous firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant
at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.
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